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Abstract
Asset prices remain depressed for several years following mutual fund fire
sales. We show that price pressure from fire sales is partly due to asymmetric
information which leads to an adverse selection problem for arbitrageurs. After a
flow shock, fund managers do not scale down their portfolio, rather, they choose
to sell a subset of low-quality stocks that subsequently under-perform. Our find-
ings help explain the magnitude and persistence of asset prices drops following
fire sales: managers try to sell their worst assets and information asymmetries
make it difficult for arbitrageurs to disentangle pure price pressure from negative
fundamentals.
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I. Introduction
Fire sales occur when an owner of an asset is forced to sell it at a discounted price in order
to meet creditor demands. The sale of assets at fire sale prices may cause similar assets held
by other market participants to decline in value, leading to a self-reinforcing process that
generates downward spirals in the net worth of firms; in turn, this may generate reductions
in real investment and output (Lorenzoni (2008), Diamond and Rajan (2011), Shleifer and
Vishny (2011)). To date, fire sales have been documented in a wide variety of asset classes,
from financial securities to airplanes and real estate.1 Yet, despite the importance of fire
sales for the economy, there is relatively little empirical evidence on the determinants of fire
sale discounts. Put differently, it is clear that asset prices remain depressed for prolonged
periods of time following fire sales. What is less clear is why these effects persist.
There are several possible explanations for fire sale discounts including: (i) market fric-
tions that limit arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Gromb and Vayanos (2002)), (ii)
specialized asset use that generates heterogeneous valuations (Williamson (1988)), (iii) finan-
cial constraints that are correlated across market participants (Shleifer and Vishny (1992)),
and (iv) information asymmetries (Akerlof (1970), Dow and Han (2018)). Importantly,
Kurlat (2018) shows that understanding the cause of fire sales is crucial to developing macro-
economic policies. In particular, he shows that optimal policies regarding aggregate invest-
ment depend on whether information asymmetries are a cause of fire sale price discounts. In
this paper, we empirically test whether information asymmetries affect fire sale discounts.
We find that they do. Specifically, we find that information asymmetries make it difficult for
asset purchasers to disentangle pure price pressure from negative information about asset
fundamentals. As a result, fire sale assets sell at deep discounts for prolonged periods.
We use mutual funds as a laboratory for examining the determinants of fire sale dis-
1Fire sales have been documented in a number of financial asset classes (e.g., Coval and Stafford
(2007), Ellul, Jotikasthira, and Lundblad (2011), Jotikasthira, Lundblad, and Ramadorai (2012), and Merrill,
Nadauld, Stulz, and Sherlund (2014); Pulvino (1998) documents evidence of fires sale in the aircraft market;
Campbell, Giglio, and Pathak (2011) document evidence of fire sales in the real estate market.
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counts. In many ways, mutual funds are an ideal setting for examining whether information
asymmetries matter during fire sales. Our sample of U.S. equity mutual funds holds ex-
tremely liquid assets that are not subject to severe limits to arbitrage.2 These assets do not
have a specialized use; they represent claims on future cash flows. Moreover, mutual fund
fire sales occur frequently, not just during periods of financial crisis when many investors
are constrained at the same time.3 Finally, and most importantly, mutual funds allow us
to precisely measure whether asset managers use information when determining which asset
to liquidate. As a result, we can use mutual funds to test whether information asymmetries
generate fire sale discounts.
It is perhaps surprising that equity mutual funds experience fire sale discounts at all.
Mutual fund fire sales are, arguably, common knowledge events. Mutual fund holdings
are publicly released at regular intervals. Moreover, although mutual fund flows are not
instantaneously viewable, a number of papers argue that fire sale price pressure is predictable
(e.g., Coval and Stafford (2007), Shive and Yun (2012), Dyakov and Verbeek (2013), Arif,
Ben-Rephael, and Lee (2016)). Together, these facts beg an important question: why don’t
arbitrageurs correct mispricing from fire sales sooner?
Our results provide an explanation for the long-lasting impact of price pressure from
mutual fund fire sales. Specifically, we show that mutual fund managers do not randomly
sell stocks when they experience a flow shock, but rather, they choose to sell those stocks
which they believe will perform poorly in the future. Moreover, we find evidence that fund
managers are more likely to sell stocks with bad fundamentals: a subset of the stocks they sell
experience severe price drops that do not subsequently rebound. In other words, part of the
observed under-performance of fire sales stocks is due to negative fundamental information:
2In our setting, mutual fund fire sales are associated with price drops in common U.S. equity securities.
To trade on these mispricings, an investors need only purchase the stocks, as such, transaction costs are
unlikely to explain the magnitude of the mispricings in our sample.
3Consistent with Shleifer and Vishny (1992), we find that times of market stress are associated with
significantly stronger fire sale discounts. However, in our main tests, we include date or date×industry fixed
effects in all of our regression specifications to absorb the impact of macro-economic conditions. As a result,
our findings are not driven by aggregate fluctuations in the ability of arbitrageurs to trade on mispricings.
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fund managers choose to sell assets that are likely to under-perform going forward, and
the resulting information asymmetries makes it difficult for arbitragers to disentangle price
pressure from negative fundamental information. Consistent with this, we find that the
Sharpe ratio to unconditionally purchasing all fire sale stocks is only 0.02. Thus, while fire
sale stocks earn predictably higher future returns, a subset of these stocks perform badly
which leads to a high standard deviation in fire sale stock returns; this prevents a natural
buyer from stepping in to buy these assets sooner.
We start by examining how managers trade after a flow shock. Following a large negative
flow shock, fund managers decrease their positions in 43.2% of their holdings, while 37.2%
of their positions remain unchanged. More surprisingly, fund managers actually increase
their holdings in 19.6% of securities. In other words, fund managers continue to purchase
securities even as their fund is shrinking in size. The results show that fund managers do
not simply scale their fund down to meet redemptions, they choose which assets to sell.
In order to examine whether fund managers use private information to make trading
decisions, we next decompose the trades of fund managers into (i) expected trading and
(ii) discretionary trading. Expected trading measures the portion of actual fund manager
trades that would be expected if the fund manager simply prorated flow shocks across each
asset in her portfolio. The intuition is simple: imagine a fund manager who has 40% of her
portfolio allocated to stock A and the remaining 60% allocated to stock B. If the manager
has no private information about asset values, then following an outflow of $5 we would
expect her to sell $5 × 40% = $2 of stock A and $5 × 60% = $3 of stock B. Put differently,
the expected trading measure assumes the portfolio manager simply scales her portfolio
down so that all assets maintain a constant weight in the portfolio. In contrast, our second
measure of trading, discretionary trading, measures the portion of actual trades that were
not expected. As such, it measures the portion of fund manager trades that are discretionary
and likely to be motivated by fund manager beliefs.
We show that discretionary trading is related to fundamental information, but expected
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trading is not. To do this, we use two proxy variables to measure negative information about
a stock: short interest and future earnings surprises.4 Both variables have been extensively
studied in the existing literature. A large literature has shown that short sellers are skilled at
identifying overvalued securities; stocks with high short interest today earn lower returns in
the future (e.g., Senchack and Starks (1993); Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008)). Similarly,
future earnings surprise allows us to measure whether fund managers use information about
firm fundamentals when trading in response to a flow shock. We find that they do.
Following a large negative flow shock, a one-standard deviation increase in short selling is
associated with discretionary sales that are 22% larger relative to their unconditional mean.
Put differently, after an outflow, fund managers are significantly more likely to sell stocks
that have high short interest.5 Similarly, we find that a one-standard deviation increase in
positive future earnings surprises is associated with discretionary sales that are 9% smaller
relative to their unconditional mean. In other words, fund managers choose to sell less
shares in stocks that beat earnings expectations in the next quarter, suggesting their trades
are motivated by fundamental information. Finally, we examine expected sales as a placebo
test; we find no relation between expected sales and either short interest or future earnings
surprises.
We then examine the stock return implications of expected and discretionary trading,
and relate them to the magnitude and persistence of fire sale price effects. Figure 1 sum-
marizes our main result. Panel A displays cumulative average abnormal returns around
all fire sale stocks, while Panel B decomposes these sales into expected and discretionary
components. In Panel A, the fire sale result is immediately apparent: stocks that are sold
by mutual funds experiencing extreme outflows have significant price drops of 5% and three
years later, they still have negative cumulative returns. In contrast, in Panel B, it is clear
4Wooldridge (2010) discusses the conditions under which a proxy variable is valid. We discuss our proxy
variables in greater detail in Section II.C.
5This finding begs an additional question: if fund managers have some selling skill, why don’t they use
it to sell stocks during periods that do not have extreme outflows? We find that they do. In Table A2 of the
Appendix we show that fund managers are significantly more likely to sell high short interest stocks during
all periods, not just periods with large outflows. We discuss this in greater detail in Section III.E.
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that the results in Panel A are driven primarily by discretionary sales. Following a large
outflow, stocks that are sold in greater than expected quantity experience extreme price
drops of 10% that never reverse over our event window. On the other hand, stocks that are
sold in the expected quantities experience significantly smaller price drops. Our results show
that managers attempt to sell the worst assets in their portfolio and this makes it difficult
for arbitrageurs to disentangle pure price pressure from negative information.
The results from multivariate analyses (that account for time-series and cross-sectional
heterogeneity in the performance of fire sale stocks) are consistent with the univariate ev-
idence in Figure 1. We find that discretionary sales are associated with significant price
pressure in the quarter of the sale while expected sales experience significantly smaller effects
that are not statistically different from zero. Across all trades, stocks that are sold by funds
experiencing large outflows experience significant price drops. A one standard deviation in-
crease in selling quantities is associated with a price drop of approximately 40 basis points.
However, when we split these trades into discretionary and expected, we find that most of
the price pressure is due to discretionary sales. Importantly, our regressions examine the
price response per unit of stock traded; as a result, our results are not driven by differential
trade sizes between discretionary and expected sales. In other words, discretionary sales
have a significantly larger impact per share traded. We also find that discretionary sales
take significantly longer to revert to their pre-fire sale price; indeed many do not ever recover
during our sample.
In addition, we examine a simple trading strategy designed to measure the value of the
information in asset fire sales. Our findings suggest that asset managers strategically choose
which assets to liquidate following negative flow shocks. Accordingly, we examine the returns
to a trading strategy that buys fire sale stocks with low discretionary selling and short sells
those stocks with high discretionary trading. For holding periods from quarter 5 to quarter
8 after the fire sale event quarter (i.e., over the year following the sale), the annualized
5-factor alpha of the strategy is 1.9%. If we extend the strategy to encompass two years
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(from quarter 5 to quarter 12 after the event quarter), the annualized 5-factor alpha of the
strategy is 2.1%. Put differently, understanding why fund managers sold a stock is crucial
to understanding return movements around asset fire sales.
Our results are related to a growing theoretical literature on fire sales. We document
evidence of the classic “lemons” problem as described in Akerlof (1970). In our setting, fund
managers who own a particular stock are likely to have some information advantage about the
value of that asset (by revealed preference). In other words, managers choose to buy an asset
because they believe they can value it better than other market participants. Following a flow
shock, managers must sell some of their holdings and they use their information advantage
to make this decision. Specifically, they reevaluate their asset holdings and choose to sell
the stocks they believe will perform poorly in the future, although the magnitude of the
flow shock may lead them to sell other (high quality) stocks at the same time. As a result,
following a flow shock, managers will sell a mix of low- and high-quality assets and other
market participants may be unable to distinguish between the two types. This causes all fire
sale assets to experience price drops.6
Our results are broadly consistent with the predictions of Dow and Han (2018) who model
fire sales in a noisy rational expectations equilibrium. In their model, some investors are
informed and act as arbitrageurs who buy some (but not all) assets following fire sales. As a
result of these informed trades, asset prices are correct and this separates low-quality assets
from high-quality assets thereby allowing other, uninformed, investors to buy the remaining
supply of fire sale assets at their fundamental value. However, in times of market stress,
the informed investors may be unable to buy assets which then prevents uniformed investors
from trading due to the classic lemons problem. Thus, all fire sale assets sell at the lower
“lemon” price. We test the predictions of this model by examining whether market stress
6Our results show that all assets experience a significant initial price drop during a fire sale, however,
after the initial period we find that discretionary stock sales continue to fall in price, while other assets
experience flat to increasing prices. This finding suggests that our results are partly due to a “lemons”
problem and partly due to an information asymmetry that allows fund managers to concentrate their selling
in those assets that are likely to experience future price drops. In other words, our findings are suggestive
of a combination of the lemons problem and private information about future price drops.
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exacerbates information asymmetries, leading to larger price drops. We find that it does.
In times of market stress, both discretionary and expected trades by fire sale funds are
associated with larger price drops.
In addition, our findings are consistent with the theoretical predictions in Malherbe
(2014), who shows that selling decisions by fund managers are more likely to be a result of
information if the fund holds a large amount of cash. Empirically, we find that discretionary
sales by fire sale fund managers have a larger price impact when the fund has a large amount
of cash. In other words, cash holdings appear to worsen the adverse selection problem,
leading to larger fire sale discounts.
Our results are also related to the large literature on fund manager skill. It is well
known that, on average, mutual fund managers do not outperform on a risk-adjusted basis.
However, a number of papers do find evidence that mutual fund managers are skilled.7 For
example, Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000) find that stocks purchases by mutual funds
outperform stocks sold by mutual funds. Similarly, Alexander, Cici, and Gibson (2007)
find that mutual funds tend to substantially outperform when their trades are valuation-
motivated, however, they are unable to outperform when their trades are flow-induced. Our
work is related to, but distinct from, the findings in Chen et al. (2000) and Alexander et al.
(2007). While the existing literature examines trading in general, we focus on fire sales, and
we use mutual funds as a laboratory for examining the cause of the large and long-lasting
impact of the price pressure. Moreover, while Alexander et al. (2007) do consider flows when
examining trades, our paper presents a novel decomposition of trading into expected and
7Berk and Green (2004) develop a model of mutual fund flows that shows, in equilibrium, skilled funds
managers will have more money allocated to their fund up until their fund no longer outperforms due to
diseconomies of scale. As a result, their model predicts that funds will not earn abnormal returns, on average,
even if some fund managers are skilled. Consistent with the diseconomies of scale assumption in Berk and
Green (2004), J. Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004) find that mutual fund returns decline as a function of
fund size. Their results imply that some fund managers may in fact be skilled. Moreover, Daniel, Grinblatt,
Titman, and Wermers (1997) examine mutual fund performance and they find some evidence that fund
managers are skilled at selecting stocks based on their characteristics. More recently, Jiang, Verbeek, and
Wang (2014) find that stocks which are heavily overweighted by active funds, relative to their benchmark
indexes, tend to significantly outperform stocks that are underweighted by active funds. Their results show
that some actively managed mutual funds are informed investors.
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discretionary components.
Finally our results complement recent work on the use of price pressure from fire sales
as an instrument to shock asset prices. Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012) develop an
identification strategy that controls for the possibility that managers use private information
when selling stocks after outflows. Our results suggest the methodology in Edmans et al.
(2012) is crucial to identifying the impact of fire sales because managers do choose which
stocks to sell. In addition, two recent papers argue that mutual fund fire sales do not satisfy
the necessary conditions for a valid instrument. Berger (2018) argues that fire sales are not
a valid instrument because they are correlated with firm fundamentals and Wardlaw (2018)
shows that scaling by dollar volume induces a mechanical correlation with returns.8 Our
paper does not examine fire sales as an instrument; rather, we examine the reason behind
fire sale discounts.
Overall, our primary contribution is that we provide the first evidence that information
asymmetries are a significant determinant of the magnitude and persistence of fire sale
discounts. Fire sales can generate important real effects (e.g., Lorenzoni (2008), Shleifer and
Vishny (2011)), and Kurlat (2018) shows that understanding the cause of fire sale discounts
is crucial to developing macro-economic policies. Our paper provides the first empirical
evidence on the cause of fire sale discounts. Moreover, while our results examine fire sales
in stocks, we note that stocks are arguably the least likely to have information asymmetries
(as a result of market efficiency). As such, our results may generalize to other asset classes:
anytime an owner is forced to liquidate assets to generate liquidity, it is possible the owner
will choose to sell their worst assets.
II. Data
To test whether price pressure from fire sales is a result of information asymmetries, we
combine data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (“CRSP”), Compustat, and
8As discussed in Section II.B, our analyses avoid this issue.
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Thomson Financial, as discussed in detail below.
A. Sample Construction
Our sample consists of all U.S. firms in Compustat over the period 1990 to 2015. We
include all common U.S. equities with CRSP share codes of 10 or 11 (i.e., we exclude Amer-
ican Depository Receipts (“ADRs”), Exchange Traded Funds (“ETFs”), and Real Estate
Investment Trusts (“REITs”)).
We obtain monthly short interest data from Compustat. Short interest is the quantity
of open short positions (in shares) with settlements on the last business day on or before
the fifteenth of a calendar month. Each month, U.S. stock exchanges calculate short interest
as of the fifteenth of the month and publicly report the data four business days later.9
We download historical short interest data from Compustat and express short interest as a
fraction of shares outstanding.
In addition to the short interest data, we also obtain financial market data from CRSP.
We include the bid-ask spread as a fraction of the closing mid-price, shares outstanding, the
daily stock return, and trading volume as a fraction of shares outstanding. We calculate
market capitalization as the product of the absolute value of CRSP share price and the
number of shares outstanding.
To measure institutional ownership in each stock, we use data from the Thomson-Reuters
Mutual Fund Holdings database (formerly known as CDA/Spectrum). The Thomson-
Reuters Mutual Fund Holdings database provides the quantity of shares held by each fund in
a given quarter. To construct capital flows into and out of mutual funds, we use the CRSP
mutual fund monthly net returns database. The calculation is discussed in detail in Section
II.B, below. We then use the MFLINKS file to match the Thomson-Reuters data with the
CRSP mutual fund data. We filter the mutual fund data to include only domestic equity
9Starting in September of 2007, the exchanges began reporting short interest data twice a month (at
the middle and end of the month). For consistency, we keep only the mid-month short interest value, as in
Rapach, Ringgenberg, and Zhou (2016).
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funds using the filters in Khan, Kogan, and Serafeim (2012); we also exclude index funds
from our sample.
To mitigate the impact of asset illiquidity, in each period we drop stocks with a price less
than $5. We also filter the mutual fund data to exclude funds with fewer than 10 holdings
or assets less than $5 million. Similar to Khan et al. (2012) the resulting database includes
approximately 300,000 observations at the stock-quarter level over our 25-year sample period.
B. Flow-induced mutual fund sales
To quantify the magnitude of fire sales in each stock, we follow Coval and Stafford (2007)
and Khan et al. (2012) to construct fund flow induced trading pressure for each stock held
by mutual funds during our sample period. Specifically, we define flows for fund j in month
s as:
Flowj,s =
[TNAj,s − TNAj,s−1 · (1 +Rj,s)]
TNAj,s−1
, (1)
where TNAj,s is total net assets for fund j as of the end of month s and Rj,s is the monthly
return for fund j in month s. We measure total net assets and returns using the CRSP
mutual fund monthly net returns database.10 To match our estimated Flowj,s variable with
quarterly fund holding data from Thomson Financial, we sum the monthly flows over the
quarter to obtain quarterly fund flows Flowj,t =
∑s+2
s (Flowj,s) for each fund j in quarter
10As in Coval and Stafford (2007), we drop funds that experienced extreme changes in TNA that may
not be reliably measured. We require -0.50 < ∆TNAj,s / TNAj,s−1 < 2.0 to be included in our sample.
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t. Then, we calculate flow-induced trading pressure for stock i in quarter t as:11
Pressurei,t =
[
∑
j
(max(0,∆Holdingsj,i,t)|flowj,t > 90th%)−
∑
j
(max(0,−∆Holdingsj,i,t)|flowj,t < 10th%)]
SharesOutstandingi,t−1
.
(2)
As in Coval and Stafford (2007), stocks in the bottom decile of Pressurei,t are considered to
be experiencing excess selling demand from mutual funds with large capital outflows. The
Coval and Stafford (2007) measure excludes obviously discretionary trades; the measure only
includes sales when there is an outflow and purchases when there is an inflow. However, fund
managers still have discretion to choose particular stocks to sell when there is an outflow
which could help explain the magnitude and duration of fire sale price drops.
To examine this possibility, we calculate a new variable that measures whether fund
managers experiencing large outflows (inflows) react by scaling down (up) their portfolio.
Specifically, we define:
ExpectedTradingi,t =∑
j
(Holdingsj,i,t−1 × flowj,t|flowj,t > 90th%) +
∑
j
(Holdingsj,i,t−1 × flowj,t|flowj,t < 10th%)
SharesOutstandingi,t−1
.
(3)
For each stock and each fund that holds the stock (and experiences extreme inflows or
outflows) during the quarter, we calculate the expected number of shares to be traded by
the fund based on the dollar flow from the fund prorated by its percentage holdings of the
stock at the beginning of the quarter. The expected trading of the stock is then defined
as the sum of the expected number of shares to be traded by all funds with extreme flow
11Khan et al. (2012) scale the Pressure variable by shares outstanding, while Coval and Stafford (2007)
scale it by average trading volume in their main specification and they scale by shares outstanding in an
alternate specification. Both Coval and Stafford (2007) and Khan et al. (2012) show that the two measures
lead to nearly identical inferences. Scaling by shares outstanding is also advantageous because Wardlaw
(2018) shows that scaling by dollar volume induces a mechanical correlation with returns; our calculation
avoids this issue.
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shocks.
Our measure of expected trading is designed to represent a counter-factual measure of
fund trading absent a fire sale. Put differently, it answers the question, “What would we
expect fund managers to do if a flow shock had not occurred?” While there is not necessarily
one unique answer to this question, our measure has several desirable properties. First,
our method is motivated by the idea that funds managers perform an optimization that
generates portfolio weights, and as money enters or exits the portfolio, they pro-rate inflows
and outflows across their portfolio using these weights. As such, flows do not lead to any
change in the portfolio weights. Second, by construction, our approach isolates the passive
portion of trading from the active portion of trading. Our measure assumes that the fund
manager holds her target portfolio so that, absent flows, she will not trade unless some new
information changes her optimal portfolio weights. Third, our calculation does not divide
by stock price; as such, we do not build in a mechanical correlation between trading and
returns (e.g., Wardlaw (2018)).12
Using our expected trading measure, we then calculate the discretionary sales and pur-
chases of fund managers experiencing large outflows or inflows. Formally, we define:
DiscretionaryTradingi,t = Pressurei,t − ExpectedTradingi,t. (4)
Importantly, expected trading is defined by conditioning on extreme inflows and outflows
in the exact same manner as Pressure. As a result, our measures allow us to decompose
Pressure into an expected component and a discretionary component.13 The resulting
12For example, an alternative way to calculate expected trading would define it as ExpectedTradingi,t =
(weightj,i,t−1 × TNAj,t)/pi,t, where weightj,i,t−1 is the weight fund j held in stock i last period and pi,t is
the end of period price of stock i. While this measure is similar to our measure in equation (3), it builds in
a mechanical relation between trading and stock returns. In addition, it implies that managers will need a
large amount of re-balancing each period even absent flow shocks: to keep asset weights constant managers
should sell recent winners and buy recent losers each period. In contrast, our approach implies that fund
managers will not trade absent flow shocks or information that changes their target weights going forward.
13Note that a negative value of discretionary trading implies the fund manager owns less than expected
while a positive value implies the manager owns more than expected. While a fund manager might choose
not to trade in some assets following a flow shock, this reflects a choice and our discretionary trading
variable reflects this fact.
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variables allow us to measure (i) whether fund managers experiencing large outflows (inflows)
react by scaling down (up) their portfolio and (ii) whether discretionary trading by these
fund managers can explain the strong and long-lasting under-performance of fire sale assets.14
C. Proxy Variables
If managers use fundamental information when deciding which assets to trade, then our
DiscretionaryTrading variable should be related to measures of fundamental value. To test
this, we use two different variables to proxy for fundamental information. First, we define the
short interest ratio (ShortInteresti,t−1) of firm i in quarter t− 1 as the ratio of shares held
short to the number of shares outstanding in the period prior to a fire sale. As previously
discussed, a large literature has found that short sellers are skilled at identifying overvalued
securities (e.g., Senchack and Starks (1993)). More recently, Rapach et al. (2016) find
that short interest contains information about aggregate market returns and several papers
provide evidence that short sellers are skilled at processing information (e.g., Karpoff and
Lou (2010), Boehmer et al. (2008); Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2012). Accordingly,
we use it as a measure of negative fundamental information.15 Second, we calculate a measure
of future earnings surprises (EarnSurprisei,t+1) using a rolling seasonally adjusted random
walk model as in Livnat and Mendenhall (2006). If fund managers do have private negative
information, then we expect their trading decisions to predict future earnings surprises.16
By construction, EarnSurprise has a mean of zero, since it measures deviations from
the expected value of earnings. However, short interest does not have a mean of zero, and
some stocks have persistently different levels of short interest. We stress that our regression
specifications include firm- and time-fixed effects, so our short interest variable effectively
14We note that our measures are related to the measures constructed in Khan et al. (2012). In many
ways, our paper is the complement to theirs. Their measures are designed to focus on purchases by funds
that do not have private information; thus, they focus on inflow-driven purchases. In contrast, we specifically
focus on sales that are not driven by flows (i.e., discretionary sales).
15Because short interest is highly right-skewed, we use the natural log of the short interest ratio.
16Because the random walk model generates several observations that are more than 10 standard devia-
tions from the mean, we winsorize EarnSurprisei,t+1 at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
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measures deviations from the expected value of short interest for each stock and time period.
As such, in our analyses we are not simply screening on stocks which always have high short
interest, but rather, stocks which likely had recent (unexpected) negative signals.17
Figure 2 displays a graph of ShortInterest and EarnSurprise in event time around fire
sale events. For the average fire sale, the results show that short interest tends to rise sharply
right before the event quarter, peaking a few periods later, before it subsequently declines.
The event time data on short interest is consistent with a number of explanations. First, it
is possible that short sellers are skilled at anticipating which funds are likely to experience
negative flow shocks which will result in forced selling. As a result, short sellers may front-
run stocks that are owned by funds which will soon experience fire sales. Indeed, several
papers document robust evidence of front-running (e.g., Shive and Yun (2012), Dyakov and
Verbeek (2013), Arif et al. (2016), Barbon, Maggio, Franzoni, and Landier (2019)). Second,
it is also possible that negative information jointly leads to high short interest and selling by
fund managers. We note that these two explanations are not mutually exclusive. However,
to help distinguish between these two competing explanations, we also plot our second proxy
variable, EarnSurprise, in Figure 2. The figure clearly shows that, on average, stocks in the
fire sale portfolio tend to experience negative earnings surprises in the quarters immediately
following the fire sale. In other words, the results suggest that our proxy variables are
measuring negative fundamental information.18
D. Summary statistics
Table I provides summary statistics for the combined database. The mean (median) short
interest ratio (ShortInterest) over our sample is 3% (1.4%), consistent with the existing
literature (e.g., Rapach et al. (2016)). As previously mentioned, in our main specifications
we use the natural log of short interest, since it is highly right-skewed (the 99th percentile
17Our results are also robust to constructing a measure of abnormal short interest, which projects short
interests on a vector of observable firm characteristics and takes the residual as a measure of abnormal short
selling, as in Karpoff and Lou (2010).
18In the Appendix, we provide a detailed discussion of the requirements for a valid proxy variable.
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is 24%). In addition, we also take the natural log of our control variables, since they are all
highly right-skewed. Finally, we note that the mean of discretionary trading is negative,
indicating that on average, discretionary sales are more likely to occur than discretionary
buys.
III. Results
In this section, we examine whether the magnitude and persistence of price pressure
following fire sales can be explained by negative information which leads to selective selling
by fund managers. Our findings suggest that price pressure from fire sales can partially be
explained by selective selling by fund managers, which leads to information asymmetries that
make it difficult for arbitrageurs to disentangle pure price pressure from negative information.
We begin by examining the trading motivations of fund managers to determine which
stocks they sell (and why) following fire sales. We then examine the risk-adjusted returns to
a simple-trading strategy to quantify the value of the information in fire sales. Finally, we
discuss the implications of our findings.
A. Trading Motivation of Fund Managers
To investigate the magnitude and persistence of fire sale discounts, we first examine the
trading motivation of managers following a flow shock. As previously discussed, the infor-
mation set of fund managers is latent, which makes it difficult to know why fund managers
choose to sell a particular stock. Thus, we use earnings surprises and short interest as proxy
variables for negative fundamental information. Specifically, we examine whether managers
are more likely to sell stocks which experienced recently high short interest or have negative
future earnings surprises. The null hypothesis is that, absent negative information about the
fundamental value of each stock, fund managers experiencing extreme redemptions should
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sell stocks in proportion to their holdings.19 For example, if a manager had 40% of her portfo-
lio allocated to stock A and 60% allocated to stock B and she experienced $5 in redemptions,
then we would expect her to sell $2 of stock A and $3 of stock B. On the other hand, if
the manager has private information that one of these stocks is likely to underperform going
forward, we would expect the manager to concentrate her selling in that asset.
We start by examining summary statistics of the trading behavior of distressed funds
during a fire sale. Consistent with Coval and Stafford (2007), we define distressed funds as
those funds in the top 10% of outflows each quarter, and we then examine whether distressed
fund managers scale down their portfolio in order to keep the weight on each asset constant.
The results are shown in Panel A of Table II. Interestingly, following large outflows, fund
managers do not simply scale down their portfolio. In fact, fund managers decrease their
positions in 43.2% of assets and they maintain their position in 37.2% of assets. Moreover,
they actually increase their holdings in 19.6% of securities. Thus, the summary statistics
provide strong evidence that managers do not scale down their portfolios and rather they
choose to concentrate their selling in a subset of assets.
Accordingly, we next whether these selling choices are motivated by fundamental infor-
mation using linear probability panel regressions of the form:
1[Sell]i,t = β1StockCharacteristics+ FEi + FEt + i,t, (5)
where 1[Sell]i,t is an indicator variable that equals one if a distressed fund manager sells stock
i in quarter t, and StockCharacteristics is a vector of firm-level characteristics that includes
our two proxy variables for information about the fundamental value of the firm, either: (i)
short interest or (ii) future earnings surprises. In addition, StockCharacteristics includes
two proxies for asset liquidity: (i) the bid-ask spread and (ii) market capitalization. We
19For example, the output from a Markowitz optimization would keep the weights in each asset fixed as
money is withdrawn from the portfolio. Of course, more realistically, it is likely that fund managers would
sell stocks in proportion to their holdings after accounting for the relative liquidity of each asset. Accordingly,
we include measures of liquidity in our analyses.
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also include firm fixed effects in all models to control for time-invariant firm characteristics.
Finally, we control for time-varying macro-economic conditions using industry×date fixed
effects. This specification ensures that our estimates are not driven by aggregate events
(like a financial crisis) when many investors are constrained at the same time. Moreover, it
allows aggregate shocks to exert differential effects across industries. As such, the resulting
estimates allow us to examine whether stock-level information affects the trading behavior
of fund managers.
The results are shown in Panel B of Table II, with t-statistics calculated using standard
errors clustered by firm and date (i.e., year-quarter) shown below the estimates in italics.
In all of the specifications we find strong evidence that fund managers are more likely to
sell stocks with negative fundamental information. In model (1), the coefficient of 0.0223 on
Short Interest suggests that a one standard deviation increase in short interest is associated
with an 10.0% increase in the probability of sale by a manager (relative to the unconditional
mean). In other words, fund managers are significantly more likely to sell stocks with
negative information. Similarly, the coefficient of -0.2314 on EarnSurprise suggests that
a one standard deviation increase in future negative earnings surprises is associated with
a 1.4% increase in the probability of sale by a manager. By definition, this result implies
that fund managers have fundamental information; their selling decisions are associated with
future earnings surprises. Put differently, fund managers are not scaling down their portfolio
during fire sales; rather, they are strategically selling assets that are likely to under-perform
going forward.
Interestingly, we also find that fund managers are significantly more likely to sell larger
stocks and they are significantly less likely to sell illiquid stocks, as measured by the bid-ask
spread. The results suggest that managers prefer to sell stocks that are easier to liquidate.
These findings are consistent with the results in Strahan and Tanyeri (2014) who find that
money market fund managers sold their most liquid holdings following the collapse of Lehman
brothers.
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To show that DiscretionaryTrading, but not ExpectedTrading, is related to fund man-
agers’ information set, we next examine the determinants of trading size for expected and
discretionary trading, respectively. Specifically, in Table III, we repeat the analysis using
OLS panel regressions to examine the relation between the magnitude of trading decisions
and our proxies for negative information according to the model:
∆Holdingsi,t = β1StockCharacteristics+ Controls+ FEi + FEt + i,t, (6)
where ∆Holdingsi,t measures the magnitude of trading using either DiscretionaryTrading
in models (1) and (2) or ExpectedTradingi,t in models (3) and (4). DiscretionaryTrading
measures the strategic component of managerial trading decisions. A positive value of
DiscretionaryTrading indicates that, on average, fund managers sold less than expected,
while a negative value indicates that they sold more than expected.
Once again, the results suggest that fund managers choose which stocks to sell, and they
sell more shares of stocks in which they have negative information. The negative and statisti-
cally significant coefficient on LN(ShortInterest) in model (1) indicates that a one standard
deviation increase in short interest is associated with a 22% increase in discretionary sell-
ing relative to the unconditional mean. Similarly, the positive and significant coefficient
on EarnSurprise in column (2) suggests that managers liquidate fewer positions that have
positive future earnings surprises. A one standard deviation increase in EarnSurprise is
associated with a decrease in discretionary sales of nearly 9%, relative to the unconditional
mean. Overall, the results show fund managers sell more shares of stocks that have negative
fundamentals. In addition, we again find evidence that fund managers liquidate more shares
of large stocks, consistent with the findings in Strahan and Tanyeri (2014).
In models (3) and (4) we examine the relation between ExpectedTrading and our proxies
for fundamental information. This analysis serves as a placebo test: if our measures of
discretionary and expected trading correctly categorize trades, then we would expect to
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find no relation between expected trading and our proxies for fundamental information.20
Indeed, in columns (3) through (4) we find no relation between expected trading and either
short interest or EarnSurprise. In both models the coefficient estimates are economically
and statistically insignificant.
In sum, our evidence suggests that managers strategically choose which stocks to sell
following a flow shock and this choice contains fundamental information. As a result, our
results are distinct from existing findings that short sellers front-run mutual fund fire sales
(e.g., Shive and Yun (2012), Dyakov and Verbeek (2013), Arif et al. (2016), Barbon et
al. (2019)). We find a positive relation between short interest in a specific stock and selling
behavior by fund managers. However, the front-running hypothesis suggests that short sellers
can anticipate which funds will be distressed. But without further private information, short
sellers should not be able to identify specific stocks that managers will choose to sell in
greater than expected proportion. Importantly, we show that most stocks in a distressed
fund’s portfolio are not sold during a fire sale; on average, distressed funds decrease their
holdings in only 43.2% of the stocks in their portfolio. Moreover, our results show that fund
managers over-sell stocks that are likely to experience negative future earnings surprises.
Thus, while the existing literature has documented significant evidence of front-running, our
results document a new fact: following flow shocks, mutual fund managers choose to sell
those stocks that have negative fundamental information.
These findings have important implications. As noted in Berger (2018) and Wardlaw
(2018), a number of recent papers have used mutual fund fire sales as an exogenous instru-
ment to shock stock prices. Consistent with our results, Berger (2018) and Wardlaw (2018)
show that this instrument likely fails to satisfy the exclusion restriction in most settings be-
cause fire sales are correlated with firm characteristics. Our results show why: mutual fund
managers choose which stocks to sell, and they sell stocks that are likely to underperform
in the future. Accordingly, our findings show the identification strategy in Edmans et al.
20We thank Vyacheslav Fos for suggesting this test.
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(2012) is crucial to identifying the impact of fire sales because managers choose which stocks
to sell, and these choices are a function of firm fundamentals.
B. Performance of Selling Decisions
If fund managers are truly selling more of those stocks that, ex-ante, had negative fun-
damental information then we would expect these assets to perform worse in the future.
Accordingly, in this section we examine the performance of discretionary and expected sales
by fund managers.
We start with a simple event study of abnormal returns around fire sales. As in Coval
and Stafford (2007), we calculate the abnormal return on stock i as the monthly return on
stock i in excess of the equally-weighted average return of all stocks held by mutual funds
that month. To examine the performance of discretionary and expected trading decisions by
fund managers, we first sort all fire sale stocks into terciles based on discretionary trading in
quarter t. Stocks in the lowest tercile have more selling pressure than expected (Sold More),
stocks in the middle tercile have selling pressure approximately equal to the expected selling
pressure (Sold Expected), and stocks in the highest tercile have less selling pressure than
expected (Sold Less).21 We form portfolios at time t=0 (when the fire sale occurs) and then
examine the returns in event time over the subsequent three years.
Figure 1 displays compound abnormal returns in event time over a three-year window
around fire sales.22 Table IV contains the corresponding monthly return values as well
as t-statistics and the cumulative return values. In Panel A of Figure 1, we display the
cumulative average abnormal returns for all fire sale stocks, similar to the well-known return
pattern documented by Coval and Stafford (2007). While our sample covers a substantially
longer time period than Coval and Stafford (2007), we confirm their main finding: fire sale
21Note that we form the Sold Expected tercile by ranking discretionary trading, instead of ranking
expected trading, because the two variables are not orthogonal. Thus, our methodology ensures that the
Sold Expected tercile contains the portion of expected trading that was not correlated with high or low
discretionary trading.
22We thank Malcolm Wardlaw for helpful discussions (and code) regarding the construction of Figure 1.
20
stocks experience extreme price drops that persist for several years. However, in Panel
B of Figure 1, we plot the cumulative average abnormal returns for fire sale stocks, split
into terciles based on discretionary trading. Our main finding is immediately clear: the
magnitude and persistence of fire sale discounts are driven primarily by discretionary sales.
Following a large outflow, stocks that are sold in greater than expected quantity experience
extreme price drops that never reverse over our event window. On the other hand, stocks
that are sold in the expected quantities experience significantly smaller price drops. The
corresponding numbers in Table IV confirm these findings.23 Four quarters after a fire sale,
stocks that are sold in greater than expected quantities exhibit cumulative average abnormal
returns of -10%. However, stocks that are sold as expected experience cumulative average
abnormal returns of -5%. Moreover, stocks that are sold in lower than expected quantities
exhibit cumulative average abnormal returns of only -2%. These latter two groups begin
correcting after approximately one year; in contrast, the first group never corrects over our
event window.
Our results are generally consistent with models of adverse selection in which fire sales
cause managers to sell a mix of both low-quality and high-quality assets (e.g., Dow and Han
(2015)). Following a flow shock, managers choose to sell the worst stocks in their portfolio;
these stocks experience subsequent price drops that do not later reverse. If the flow shock is
large enough, fund managers must also sell some high-quality assets, and arbitrageurs may
have difficulty distinguishing between the good and bad assets. As a result, all fire sale assets
23In Figure A1 of the Appendix, we show that similar results also emerge if we sort fire sale stocks on our
proxy variables for fundamental information. Following a fire sale, the Low Short Interest portfolio stocks
actually increase in value, on average. Over the next two years, they earn a cumulative average return of
nearly 20% (around 10% per year). On the other hand, High Short Interest stocks experience extreme price
drops during the event month and for the next six quarters. Moreover, the prices of these stocks remain low;
they do not revert over our sample period. Similarly, Panel B displays results when EarnSurprise is our
proxy variable. Following a fire sale, the Positive EarnSurprise portfolio stocks increase initially, and then
remain relatively flat over our sample period. However, Negative EarnSurprise stocks experience extreme
price drops during the event month and again, their prices continue to fall for approximately six quarters.
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sell for a discount.24
Of course, univariate sorts do not account for time-series or cross-sectional heterogeneity
that could impact our inferences. Thus, we examine OLS panel regressions of the form:
AbnReti,t:t+h = β1ExpectedTradingi,t + β2DiscretionaryTradingi,t
+Controls+ FEi + FEt + i,t:t+h,
(7)
where AbnReti,t:t+h is the abnormal return from quarter t to quarter t+ h for stock i, where
t=0 in models (1) to (3) and t=+5 to +12 in models (4) through (6), ExpectedTradingi,t
is the portion of Pressurei,t that equals fund flows prorated to the stock-level using each
stock’s weight in the portfolio, and DiscretionaryTradingi,t is the portion of Pressurei,t
this is not from ExpectedTradingi,t.
The results are shown in Table V with t-statistics calculated using standard errors clus-
tered by firm and date shown below the coefficient estimates. We include firm fixed effects
in all models, and either date or industry×date fixed effects, as indicated at the bottom of
the panel. Models (1) and (4) display the baseline relation between returns and fire sales, as
measured by Pressure. Consistent with prior studies, we find significant evidence of price
pressure from fire sales. To aid interpretation, we standardize all independent variables to
have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Thus, the coefficient of 0.0040 on
Pressure in model (1) indicates that a one standard deviation increase in selling pressure is
associated with a 40 basis point decrease in abnormal returns during the event month.25 In
models (4) through (6), we test for evidence of return reversals. The coefficient of -0.0058 on
Pressure in model (4) indicates that a one standard deviation increase in selling pressure is
24We note that in a pure adverse selection story with a pooling equilibrium, discretionary trades and
expected trades should initially sell at the same discount. In our setting, expected trades initially sell for
a large discount, although it is smaller than the discount at which discretionary trades sell. These results
suggest that arbitrageurs may be able to partially understand the trading motivations for some expected
sales, such that not all of them sell for the same discount as discretionary trades.
25Pressure, Expected Trading, and Discretionary Trading take on positive values for buying pressure
and negative values for selling pressure. Thus, a positive coefficient in Table V indicates price pressure in
the direction of the trade, while a negative coefficient indicates a reversal.
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associated with a 58 basis point increase in abnormal returns over the window t=+5 to +12,
corresponding to a two-year return starting one year after the file sale. Put differently, the
results in models (1) and (4) document strong evidence of fire sale price drops in the event
month that reverse over a two year period starting the year after a fire sale.
In models (2), (3), (5), and (6) we examine the relation between returns and expected
and discretionary trading. Because these variables are standardized, it is clear from the
table that discretionary trading is associated with significantly more price pressure than
expected trading during the event quarter. In model (3), the results suggest that a one
standard deviation increase in discretionary trading is associated with a 49 basis point
increase in abnormal returns; this effect is approximately seven times larger than the impact
of expected trading. In models (5) and (6), we again test for evidence of reversals over
a two-year window starting one year after the file sale. In both models (5) and (6), the
coefficient on discretionary trading is statistically insignificant, implying that price pressure
from discretionary sales does not reverse over the event window. The results suggest that
discretionary sales are concentrated in low-quality assets; as such, these assets experience
price declines that do not later reverse. Finally, the negative and statistically significant
coefficients on expected trading in models (5) and (6) suggest that these assets slightly
outperform by approximately 80 basis points over the two-year period from t+5 to t+12.
In other words, these assets initially experienced price drops that were too large, suggesting
that arbitrageurs were initially unable to distinguish between price pressure from fire sales
and selling due to asymmetric information.26 Importantly, we note that our regression
results account for trade quantity. As such, our results are not driven by differential trades
sizes between discretionary and expected sales. In other words, discretionary sales have a
significantly larger impact per share traded.27
26These findings are consistent with the results in Jiang et al. (2014) who find that the overweight and
underweight decisions of fund managers contain information about future stock returns.
27Of course, if price impact is non-linear in the quantity of shares traded, it is possible that discretionary
trades could have a larger impact than expected trades if discretionary trades were significantly larger in
size. However, as shown in Table I, discretionary trading and expected trading have a similar range and
standard deviation.
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In light of these findings, we next examine whether negative fundamental information can
explain the persistence of fire sale discounts. Existing evidence suggests that asset prices
remain depressed for two years (or more) following fire sales. Accordingly, we run panel
regressions of the form:
Correctioni,t = β1ExpectedTrading + β2DiscretionaryTrading + FEi + FEt + i,t, (8)
where Correctioni,t is the number of quarters following a fire sale that it takes the stock’s
cumulative return to reach zero. We define the number of quarters to correction as a number
between 1 and 12 if the return reverts to zero within 12 quarters, and we set the value to
13 if the reversion does not occur during the time period.28 We again examine the impact
of DiscretionaryTrading and ExpectedTrading. If DiscretionaryTrading is driven by
negative information, we would expect that those stocks that were sold as discretionary
trades are less likely to experience a price correction.
The results are shown in Table VI with t-statistics calculated using standard errors clus-
tered by firm and date shown below the estimates in italics. We include firm fixed effects,
date fixed effects, and/or industry×date fixed effects, as indicated at the bottom of the table.
As before, models (1) through (3) display the baseline relation between the duration of the
price correction and fire sales, as measured by Pressure, while models (4) through (6) ex-
amine the relation between the duration of price corrections and DiscretionaryTrading and
ExpectedTrading. In column (1), the negative and statistically significant coefficient on
Pressure indicates that stocks with more selling pressure are likely to take significantly
longer to achieve a price correction. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in
Pressure is associated with a 4% increase in the time to correction. In columns (4) through
(6), we see that once again, this result holds primarily in discretionary trades.
The results in this section provide clear evidence that the discretionary trades of mutual
28Note that most observations revert within 13 quarters, so this does not result in a significant censoring
problem. Our results are robust to alternate cutoff points that extend beyond 12 quarters.
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fund managers are associated with significant price drops that persist for prolonged periods
of time. These results are consistent with extant theoretical models of adverse selection. In
the next section, we test specific predictions of these models.
C. Impact of Adverse Selection
So far, our evidence suggests that when faced with a flow shock, fund managers strategi-
cally choose which stocks to sell and these choices contain valuable information about future
prices. Moreover, our findings suggest that fund managers will choose to sell low-quality as-
sets, but because flow shocks can be large in magnitude, they will also sell some high-quality
assets. The resulting mix of low-quality and high-quality asset sales leads to an adverse
selection problem similar to the classic lemons problem (Akerlof (1970)). In this section,
we test the predictions of theoretical models on adverse selection in fire sales regarding the
impacts of market conditions and funds’ cash holdings, respectively.
Dow and Han (2018) model fire sales in a noisy rational expectations equilibrium in
which some investors are informed and act as arbitrageurs who buy some (but not all) assets
following fire sales. As a result of these informed trades, asset prices are corrected following
fire sales; in other words, these specialized arbitrageurs succeed in separating low-quality
assets from high-quality assets thereby allowing other, uninformed, investors to buy the
remaining supply of fire sale assets at their fundamental value. However, in times of market
stress, the informed investors may be unable to buy assets which then prevents uniformed
investors from trading due to the classic lemons problem. Thus, market stress causes all fire
sale assets to sell at a lower “lemon” price.
We test the predictions of this model by examining whether market stress exacerbates
information asymmetries, leading to larger price drops for both ExpectedTrading and
DiscretionaryTrading. To do this, we download a time-series of the Volatility Index (VIX)
from the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). We define an indicator variable for
market stress (Stress) that takes the value one if VIX exceeds 40, and zero otherwise. This
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cutoff corresponds to approximately the 98th percentile of all VIX observations.
In addition, we also test the theoretical predictions in Malherbe (2014), who shows that
selling decisions by fund managers are more likely to be a result of private information if
the fund holds a large amount of cash. The intuition for this prediction is simple: if a fund
manager has enough cash to meet redemption requests and she still sells a stock, then it is
likely that her trade is informationally motivated. As a result, all else equal, cash holdings
exacerbate the adverse selection issue around asset fire sales. To test this prediction, we
construct an indicator variable for cash holdings (Cash) that takes the value one if a stock
is held by mutual funds that on average have more than 2% of net assets in cash, and zero
otherwise.
We then run OLS panel regressions of the form:
AbnReti,t = β1ExpectedTradingi,t +β2DiscretionaryTradingi,t +β3Si,t + ΓXi,t +FEi + i,t,
(9)
where AbnReti,t is the abnormal return in quarter t=0, where t=0 is the quarter of the
fire sale for stock i, ExpectedTradingi,t is the portion of Pressure that equals fund flows
prorated to the stock-level using each stock’s weight in the portfolio, DiscretionaryTrading
is the portion of Pressure this is not from ExpectedTrading, Si,t is either (i) an indicator
variable that takes the value one if a stock is held by funds that have more than 2% of net
assets in cash and zero otherwise (Cash) or (ii) an indicator variables that takes the value
one if the VIX is above 40 and zero otherwise (Stress), and Xi,t is a vector of interaction
terms that contain ExpectedTrading×Si,t and DiscretionaryTrading×Si,t. The Malherbe
(2014) model predicts that DiscretionaryTrading will have a larger impact when funds have
higher cash holdings, while the Dow and Han (2018) model predicts that ExpectedTrading
and DiscretionaryTrading will have a larger impact when VIX is high.
The results are shown in Table VII. Models (1), (2), and (5) display the benchmark cases,
without conditioning on whether the trades were discretionary or expected. In models (1)
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and (2) we find limited evidence that cash holdings are associated with a worse adverse
selection problem. In both models, the coefficient on Pressure × Cash is positive but not
statistically significant at the usual levels with a p-value of approximately 0.12. However,
in model (5) when we interact Pressure × Stress, we do find a positive and statistically
significant coefficient. The result suggests that market stress hinders the ability of specialized
arbitrageurs to buy assets, and as a result, fire sale assets are sold at larger discounts.29
In models (3), (4), and (6), we examine the results for discretionary and expected trading.
In models (3) and (4), the coefficient on Discretionary × Cash is positive and statistically
significant, however the coefficient on Expected×Cash is insignificant. This result supports
the theoretical predictions in Malherbe (2014); cash holdings appear to magnify the impact of
information asymmetries on asset prices. When managers have large cash holdings and they
still choose to sell an asset following large outflows (i.e., DiscretionaryTrading is large), it
is more likely that they have negative information about the asset. Moreover, these findings
are also consistent with Simutin (2013) who finds that fund managers with abnormally high
cash holdings tend to make superior stock selections.
In model (6), we find that the coefficients on Discretionary × Stress and Expected ×
Stress are both positive and statistically significant.30 In other words, the results are con-
sistent with the predictions in the Dow and Han (2018) model which argues that specialized
arbitrageurs help separate low-quality assets and high-quality assets thereby allowing other,
uninformed, investors to buy the remaining supply of fire sale assets at the correct price.
When combined with our return results in Table IV, which found that expected trades sell for
a discount that is smaller than the discount on discretionary trades, the overall picture be-
comes clear: specialized arbitrageurs are able to partially determine the trading motivations
for some expected sales, such that not all of them sell for the same discount as discretionary
29Of course, because our market stress variable does not have any cross-sectional variation, we are unable
to include time fixed effects in models that contain it. As such, these results could be picking up other
aggregate fluctuations that are correlated with fire sale discounts.
30In unreported results, available upon request, we find that these results do not hold if we use a continuous
measure of VIX, instead of an indicator variable. These findings suggest that the relation between adverse
selection and asset prices is non-linear in market stress.
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trades. However, in times of market stress, these arbitrageurs are prevented from trading
and as a result, all fire sale assets sell at a large discount.
D. The Value of Fire Sale Information
Finally, we explore the value of the information in fund manager’s selling decisions around
fire sales. To do this, we examine risk-adjusted portfolio returns to strategies that condition
on whether mutual fund fire sales are discretionary. As a benchmark, we first note that the
Sharpe ratio from unconditionally buying all fire sale stocks and holding them from quarter
5 to quarter 8 after the fire sale event quarter is only 0.02. Specifically, even though Figure 1
shows that fire sales stock prices are likely to rise from quarter 5 to quarter 8, these returns
exhibit huge variation: the standard deviation of returns is 63%, relative to a mean raw
return of 3.13%.31 The Sharpe ratio results highlight that buying all fire sale stocks is a
risky proposition, thereby explaining the reluctance of arbitrageurs to correct this apparent
mispricing. We next show that the large standard deviation of fire sale stock returns can be
explained by the discretionary trading decisions of fund managers.
We start by forming two portfolios: the first portfolio consists of fire sale stocks with
low discretionary selling; in other words, this portfolio is composed of stocks that were sold
less than expected. The second portfolio consists of fire sale stocks with high discretionary
selling; in other words, this portfolio is composed of stocks that were sold more than expected.
As before, on each date we form terciles based on discretionary trading, stocks in the lowest
tercile have more selling pressure than expected (Sold More) while stocks in the highest
tercile have less selling pressure than expected (Sold Less). We then calculate calendar time
returns to these portfolios over various horizons, using equal-weighted portfolio returns. We
also calculate calendar time returns to a long-short strategy that buys stocks that were sold
less than expected, and short sells stocks that were sold more than expected. Finally, we
31Note that, to be consistent with Coval and Stafford (2007), Figure 1 shows abnormal returns, which
exhibit larger return movements from quarter 5 to quarter 8 than the raw returns although raw returns are
also statistically significantly and positive over this period.
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regress the monthly excess returns of our portfolios on the Fama and French (2015) five
factors.32
We examine two different holding horizons. The evidence in Figure 1 suggests that both
discretionary and expected fire sale trades experience price drops, however expected fire sale
trades begin to correct after approximately one year. Accordingly, in Panel A of Table VIII,
we examine returns to a portfolio that begins trading five quarters after the event date (i.e.,
one year after the fire sale) and holds stocks until the eighth quarter (corresponding to a
one-year holding horizon). In Panel B of Table VIII, we examine returns to a portfolio that
begins trading five quarters after the event date and holds stocks until the twelfth quarter
(corresponding to a two-year holding horizon).
The results are shown in Table VIII with t-statistics, calculated using standard errors
clustered by firm, reported next to the coefficient estimates. In Panel A, for holding periods
from quarter 5 to quarter 8 after the fire sale event quarter (i.e., over the year following the
sale), the annualized 5-factor alpha of the strategy is 1.9%. In Panel B, when we extend the
strategy to encompass two years (from quarter 5 to quarter 12 after the event quarter), the
annualized 5-factor alpha of the strategy is 2.1%.33 In sum, these findings further confirm
that there is valuable information in asset fire sales.
E. Interpretation of Results
Our results all point to the same conclusion: fund managers selectively choose which
stocks to sell following a fire sale and this makes it difficult for arbitrageurs to disentangle
pure price pressure from negative information. Thus, the well-documented price drop in fire
sale assets is partly attributable to the classic lemons problem and partly attributable to
private information that allows fund managers to concentrate their selling in those assets
that are likely to experience future price drops. These findings have important implications
for academics, practitioners, and regulators. A number of papers show that fire sales have
32The monthly Fama and French (2015) factors are from Kenneth French’s website.
33These findings are robust to alternate trading horizons.
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important implications for macro-economic policies. For example, Lorenzoni (2008) argues
that inefficient credit booms can occur in an economy where investors do not internalize
pecuniary externalities from fire sales. As a result, regulators could increase welfare by
reducing aggregate investment ex-ante. However, Kurlat (2018) shows that these findings
depend on the reason underlying fire sale price drops: if fire sales are the result of asymmetric
information, then the policy prescription is actually reversed. In other words, regulators
could increase welfare by increasing aggregate investment ex-ante. Thus, understanding why
asset prices fall during fire sales is crucial to our understanding of macro-prudential policies
regarding investment. Our results provide novel evidence on this point. However, we note
that several outstanding issues remain.
First, any statement about the motivation of sales following flow shocks should explain
both (i) the choice of assets which are sold and (ii) the timing of those sales. Put differently,
if fund managers have negative fundamental information about some of their holdings, why
didn’t they sell these stocks sooner? Moreover, why didn’t they short sell these assets in
order to profit from their negative information? There are several possible explanations
for this. First, in Table A2 of the Appendix we show that fund managers are significantly
more likely to sell stocks with high short interest during all periods, not just periods with
large outflows. Second, we note that our analyses included firm and time fixed effects, so
our proxy variables for negative information focus on new (abnormal) information about
a stock. As such, the negative signal largely arrived proximate to the flow shock, which
explains both the choice of assets and the timing of the sale. Third, many mutual fund
managers are precluded from short selling, which limits their ability to profit from negative
fundamental information. Finally, we also note that fund managers likely face portfolio
re-balancing costs (both pecuniary and non-pecuniary). Novy-Marx and Velikov (2016)
examine optimal trading strategies in the presence of transaction costs. They find that the
optimal trading strategy is biased towards holding a current position. In other words, even
if a manager receives a signal, it may not be optimal for them to immediately act on it. In
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our context, this suggests that fund managers may have negative information about some
of their holdings, but choose not to trade on this information right away. Following a flow
shock, managers are forced to sell and thus it becomes optimal to use their information when
making these trades.
A second issue relates to the long-standing short interest puzzle. A number of papers note
that high short interest predicts lower future returns. Since short interest data is publicly
available, this begs a question: why don’t other investors trade on the signal in short interest
until it is arbitraged away? Similarly, our results show that discretionary trades contain
information. Since mutual fund holdings and flows can be publicly observed, it should be
possible for arbitrageurs to construct a measure of discretionary trading. In our context,
these results suggest a question. Since investors face an adverse selection problem when they
see price pressure from fire sales, why don’t they use short interest and/or our measure of
discretionary trades to separate assets into low-quality and high-quality? One possibility
is that, prior to our findings, investors were unaware of the signal value in these variables
within the fire sale context. Several paper shows that return predictability diminishes after
the publication of academic studies (e.g., Schwert (2003) and McLean and Pontiff (2015)).
As a result, it is possible that price pressure from fire sales will diminish going forward
as investors learn to separate low-quality fire sale assets from high-quality fire sale assets.
Future research should continue to explore these issues.
IV. Conclusion
Asset fire sales can have an important impact on firms and the economy (Shleifer and
Vishny (2011), Lorenzoni (2008), Kurlat (2018)). It is well documented that asset prices re-
main low for prolonged periods of time when managers are forced to sell assets to meet cred-
itor demands (e.g., Coval and Stafford (2007), Ellul et al. (2011), Pulvino (1998), Campbell
et al. (2011), etc.). Yet, the precise reason for these large and persistent mispricings remains
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unclear. We use mutual funds as a setting to understand whether asymmetric information
affects asset prices during fire sales.
We provide an explanation for the puzzling persistence of price pressure from fire sales;
following a flow shock, mutual fund managers choose to sell low-quality stocks. We decom-
pose fund manager trades into expected and discretionary components. Using short interest
and future earnings surprises as proxy variables for managers’ unobservable negative signals,
we confirm that discretionary sales contain more negative information, but we find little
evidence that expected trades do. The results help explain the magnitude and persistence
of fire sale discounts. We find that discretionary sales experience large price drops and these
prices remain low for several years. In contrast, expected sales experience much smaller price
drops that quickly reverse. In other words, the results suggest fund managers attempt to sell
their worst assets which leads to an adverse selection problem for other investors. Overall,
our findings help explain the tendency of asset prices to remain depressed following fire sales:
information asymmetries make it difficult for arbitrageurs to disentangle pure price pressure
from negative information.
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Figure 1. Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns in Event Time around Fire
Sales
The figure plots cumulative average returns (CAARs) in quarterly event time for sub-samples of stocks formed
by conditioning on managerial selling decisions. Panel A plots CAARs for all fire sale stocks, while Panel B
examines this same sample broken into terciles based on whether fund managers: (i) sold more shares than
expected, (ii) sold the expected amount, or (iii) sold less shares than expected, given the asset’s weight and
the size of the flow shock. Stocks that were sold in greater than expected proportion are assigned to the Sold
More portfolio (solid black line), stocks that are sold as expected are assigned to the Sold Expected portfolio
(dashed black line), and stocks that are sold less than expected are assigned to the Sold Less portfolio (solid
gray line). As in Coval and Stafford (2007), cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) are calculated
as monthly returns in excess of the equal-weighted average return of all stocks held by mutual funds that
month. Detailed variable definitions are provided in Section II.C of the text.
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Figure 2. Negative Information in Event Time around Fire Sales
The figure plots two proxy variables for negative information: (i) Short Interest (as a
percent of shares outstanding) and (ii) future earnings surprises (EarnSurprise) calculated
using a seasonally adjusted random walk model. Both variables are plotted in event time
for fire sale stocks (i.e., those in the bottom decile of Pressure) over the period 1990
through 2015; the vertical gray bar at t = 0 indicates the fire sale quarter. Detailed variable
definitions are provided in Section II.C of the text.
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Table I
Summary Statistics
The sample includes all NYSE and NASDAQ common stocks (i.e., share codes 10 and 11)
over the period January 1990 to December 2015. The mean, median, 1st percentile, 99th
percentile, and standard deviation of the following variables are reported: Pressure is a
measure of price pressure as defined in equation (2) and based on Coval and Stafford (2007)
and Kahn, Kogan, and Serafeim (2012). ExpectedTradingi,t is the portion of Pressure
that equals fund flows prorated to the stock-level using each stock’s weight in the portfolio,
and DiscretionaryTrading is the portion of Pressure this is not from ExpectedTrading.
EarnSurprise is standardized unexpected earnings in the period after the fire sale calculated
using a seasonally adjusted random walk model, Short Interest % is short interest as a
percentage of shares outstanding, LN(Short Interest %) is the natural log of short interest as
a percentage of shares outstanding, LN(Bid-Ask %) is the natural log of the bid-ask spread
as a fraction of the closing mid-point, and LN(Market Cap.) is the natural log of market
capitalization in millions of U.S. dollars.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable Mean Median 1st % 99th % St. Dev.
Pressure 0.0005 0.0000 -0.0176 0.0222 0.0068
Expected Trading 0.0009 0.0000 -0.0082 0.0200 0.0051
Discrectionary Trading -0.0004 0.0000 -0.0237 0.0198 0.0074
EarnSurprise 0.0000 0.0015 -0.1469 0.1307 0.0292
Short Interest % 3.26% 1.43% 0.00% 23.67% 4.97%
LN(Short Interest %) -4.7019 -4.2333 -11.0303 -1.4391 2.1039
LN(Bid-Ask %) -5.0337 -4.6396 -8.8069 -2.1785 1.7114
LN(Market Cap.) 19.6611 19.4849 16.3406 24.4744 1.8104
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Table II
Trading Decisions of Fire Sale Fund Managers
This table examines the trading decisions of funds during a fire sale quarter. Panel A displays
the percent of positions within each distressed fund that were (1) decreased, (2) increased,
or (3) held constant in the fire sale quarter. Panel B examines a linear probability model of
the form:
1[Sell]i,t = β1StockCharacteristics+ FEi + FEt + i,t, (10)
where 1[Sell]i,t is an indicator variable that takes the value one if asset i was sold by a distressed
fund in quarter t, and zero otherwise, and StockCharacteristics is one of two proxy variables
for information about the fundamental value of the firm, either: (i) LN(ShortInterest)i,t−1
or (ii) future earnings surprises (EarnSurprisei,t+1). Distressed funds are funds in the top
10% of outflows each quarter. In addition, we include two measures of firm liquidity: (i) the
bid-ask spread and (ii) market capitalization. Firm fixed effects are included in all models
and we include either date (year-quarter) or date × industry fixed effects, as indicated at
the bottom of the table. t-statistics calculated using standard errors clustered by firm and
date are shown below the estimates in italics. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Trading Behavior of Fire Sale Funds
Decreased Increased Held Constant
(1) (2) (3)
Percent of Positions 43.2% 19.6% 37.2%
Panel B: Linear Probability Model
Explanatory Dependent Variable: Sell Indicator
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
LN(Short Interest %) 0.0223*** 0.0217***
(9.95) (9.85)
SUE -0.2314*** -0.2041***
(-7.27) (-6.58)
LN(Bid-Ask %) -0.0159*** -0.0169*** -0.0076*** -0.0103***
(-5.96) (-6.58) (-2.87) (-4.22)
LN(Market Cap.) 0.0996*** 0.1070*** 0.0942*** 0.0995***
(20.11) (21.64) (16.39) (17.77)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Date FE Yes No Yes No
Industry × Date FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 205,150 204,649 162,715 161,929
R-squared 55.0% 57.2% 47.0% 50.7%
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Table III
Discretionary and Expected Trading Decisions of Fire Sale Fund Managers
This table examines selling decisions by distressed funds according to an OLS panel model
of the form:
∆Holdingsi,t = β1StockCharacteristics+ Controls+ FEi + FEt + i,t,
where ∆Holdingsi,t is either DiscretionaryTrading in models (1) and (2) or
ExpectedTradingi,t in models (3) and (4). ExpectedTradingi,t is the portion of Pressure
that equals fund flows prorated to the stock-level using each stock’s weight in the portfolio,
and DiscretionaryTrading is the portion of Pressure this is not from ExpectedTrading.
StockCharacteristics is one of two proxy variables for information about the fundamen-
tal value of the firm, either: (i) LN(ShortInterest)i,t−1 or (ii) future earnings surprises
(EarnSurprisei,t+1). In addition, we include two measures of firm liquidity: (i) the bid-ask
spread and (ii) market capitalization. Firm fixed effects and industry × date (year-quarter)
fixed effects are included in all models. t-statistics calculated using standard errors clustered
by firm and date are shown below the estimates in italics. *, **, *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable:
Explanatory Discretionary Trading Expected Trading
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
LN(Short Interest %)i,t−1 -0.0417** 0.0035
(-2.16) (0.13)
SUEi,t+1 1.1935* 0.2532
(1.70) (0.54)
LN(Bid-Ask %)i,t−1 0.0479 0.0358 -0.0576 -0.1025***
(1.63) (1.13) (-1.48) (-2.89)
LN(Market Cap.)i,t−1 -0.2151*** -0.2600*** 0.1027 0.0571
(-3.49) (-4.16) (1.56) (0.82)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry × Date FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 204,649 161,929 204,649 161,929
R-squared 10.4% 10.3% 22.8% 22.8%
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Table IV
Abnormal Returns in Event Time around Fire Sales
The table displays monthly abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns (CAAR)
in event time around fire sales, where the event quarter (t=0) is the quarter in which a
stock had intensive selling pressure. ExpectedTradingi,t is the portion of Pressure that
equals fund flows prorated to the stock-level using each stock’s weight in the portfolio and
DiscretionaryTrading is the portion of Pressure this is not from ExpectedTrading. Each
quarter, all fire sale stocks are sorted into terciles based on DiscretionaryTrading. Stocks
in the lowest tercile had more selling pressure than expected (Sold More), stocks in the
middle tercile had selling pressure approximately equal to the expected selling pressure (Sold
Expected), and stocks in the highest tercile had less selling pressure than expected (Sold
Less). We form portfolio based on these terciles and examine returns in event time. As in
Coval and Stafford (2007), abnormal returns are calculated as monthly returns in excess of
the equal-weighted average return of all stocks held by mutual funds that month. The table
reports the mean abnormal return in columns (1) through (3) and the cumulative average
abnormal return (CAAR) in columns (4) through (6).
Monthly Average Abnormal Return Cumulative Average Abnormal Return
Event Sold Less Sold Expected Sold More Sold Less Sold Expected Sold More
Time (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
t=0 -2.5% -3.6% -4.8% -2.54% -3.62% -4.75%
t+1 -0.2% -0.6% -0.9% -2.75% -4.21% -5.64%
t+2 0.2% -0.4% -1.1% -2.55% -4.59% -6.73%
t+3 0.0% -0.1% -0.6% -2.52% -4.69% -7.32%
t+4 0.6% 0.2% -0.6% -1.97% -4.49% -7.91%
t+5 0.0% 0.1% -0.2% -1.92% -4.38% -8.12%
t+6 0.7% 0.4% -0.3% -1.26% -3.94% -8.47%
t+7 0.0% 0.1% -0.2% -1.24% -3.81% -8.68%
t+8 0.9% 0.3% -0.1% -0.36% -3.49% -8.76%
t+9 0.5% 0.3% 0.0% 0.16% -3.19% -8.73%
t+10 0.4% 0.2% -0.2% 0.51% -2.95% -8.90%
t+11 0.4% 0.1% -0.3% 0.89% -2.88% -9.22%
t+12 0.2% 0.0% -0.8% 1.11% -2.86% -10.04%
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Table V
Relation between Fire Sales and Returns
We estimate OLS panel regressions of the form:
AbnReti,t:t+h = β1ExpectedTradingi,t+β2DiscretionaryTradingi,t+Controls+FEi+FEt+i,t:t+h,
where AbnReti,t:t+h is the abnormal return from quarter t to quarter t+h for stock i, where
t=0 in models (1) to (3) and t=+5 to +12 in models (4) through (6), ExpectedTradingi,t is
the portion of Pressure that equals fund flows prorated to the stock-level using each stock’s
weight in the portfolio, and DiscretionaryTrading is the portion of Pressure this is not
from ExpectedTrading. As in Coval and Stafford (2007), abnormal returns are calculated
as monthly returns in excess of the equal-weighted average return of all stocks held by
mutual funds that month. Models (1) and (4) display the baseline relation between returns
and fire-sales, as measured by Pressure, while models (2), (3), (5), and (6) examine the
relation between returns and ExpectedTrading and DiscretionaryTrading. We include
firm fixed effects in all models, and either date (year-quarter) or industry × date fixed
effects, as indicated at the bottom of the panel. t-statistics calculated using standard
errors clustered by firm and date are shown below the estimates. To aid interpretation,
all independent variables are standardized to have a mean of zero and standard deviation
of one. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Explanatory Dependent Variable: AbnReti,t=0 Dependent Variable: AbnReti,t+5:t+12
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pressure 0.0040*** -0.0058*
(3.01) (-1.87)
Expected Trading 0.0014 0.0007 -0.0087** -0.0078*
(0.80) (0.35) (-2.17) (-1.92)
Discretionary Trading 0.0046*** 0.0049*** -0.0050 -0.0053
(3.33) (3.39) (-1.33) (-1.46)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Date FE No Yes No No Yes No
Industry × Time FE Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Observations 50,633 52,354 50,633 39,016 40,767 39,016
R-squared 34.6% 18.5% 34.6% 54.7% 39.4% 54.7%
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Table VI
Duration of Price Pressure Following Fire Sales
The table examines the duration of price pressure following fire-sales. Specifically, we exam-
ine the determinants of price corrections following fire-sales; a price correction occurs when
a stock’s market-adjusted return reverts back to zero during the 16 quarters following a fire
sale. To do this, we examine OLS panel models of the form:
Correctioni,t = β1ExpectedTrading + β2DiscretionaryTrading + FEi + FEt + i,t,
where Correctioni,t is the number of quarters following a fire sale that it takes the stock’s
cumulative abnormal return to reach zero. The number of quarters to correction varies
between 1 and 12 if the abnormal return reverts to zero within 12 quarters, and we set the
value to 13 if the reversion does not occur during the time period. ExpectedTradingi,t is
the portion of Pressure that equals fund flows prorated to the stock-level using each stock’s
weight in the portfolio, and DiscretionaryTrading is the portion of Pressure this is not
from ExpectedTrading. We include firm fixed effects in all models, and either date (year-
quarter) or industry × date fixed effects, as indicated at the bottom of the panel. t-statistics
calculated using standard errors clustered by firm and date are shown below the estimates.
To aid interpretation, all independent variables are standardized to have a mean of zero and
standard deviation of one. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively.
Explanatory Dependent Variable: Number of Quarters to Price Correction
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pressure -0.1383*** -0.0496* -0.0450
(-4.84) (-1.88) (-1.60)
Expected Trading -0.0636** -0.0059 0.0053
(-2.02) (-0.20) (0.18)
Discretionary Trading -0.1392*** -0.0557** -0.0537*
(-4.92) (-2.06) (-1.84)
Firm FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Date FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Industry × Date FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 54,628 52,354 50,633 54,628 52,354 50,633
R-squared 1.9% 22.2% 37.1% 1.9% 22.2% 37.1%
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Table VII
Test of Theoretical Relation between Adverse Selection and Price Pressure
The table examines the relation between trading, price pressure, and variables that theoretically
exacerbate adverse selection using panel regressions of the form:
AbnReti,t = β1ExpectedTradingi,t + β2DiscretionaryTradingi,t + β3Si,t + ΓXi,t + FEi + i,t,
where AbnReti,t is the abnormal return in quarter t=0, where t=0 is the quarter of the fire sale for
stock i, ExpectedTradingi,t is the portion of Pressure that equals fund flows prorated to the stock-
level using each stock’s weight in the portfolio, DiscretionaryTrading is the portion of Pressure
this is not from ExpectedTrading, Si,t is either (i) an indicator variable that takes the value
one if a stock is held by funds that have more than 2% of net assets in cash and zero otherwise
(Cash) or (ii) an indicator variables that takes the value one if the VIX is above 40 and zero
otherwise (Stress), and Xi,t is a vector of interaction terms that contain ExpectedTrading × Si,t
and DiscretionaryTrading×Si,t. As in Coval and Stafford (2007), abnormal returns are calculated
as monthly returns in excess of the equal-weighted average return of all stocks held by mutual funds
that month. Models (1), (2), and (5) display the baseline relation between future returns and fire-
sales, as measured by Pressure, while models (3), (4), and (6) examine the relation between future
returns and ExpectedTrading and DiscretionaryTrading. We include firm fixed effects in all
models, and date (year-quarter) or industry × date fixed effects, as indicated at the bottom of the
panel. t-statistics calculated using standard errors clustered by firm and date are shown below the
estimates. To aid interpretation, all independent variables are standardized to have a mean of zero
and standard deviation of one. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
Explanatory Dependent Variable: Abnormal Announcement Quarter Return
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pressure 0.1532 0.1538 0.4624**
(0.71) (0.65) (2.14)
Expected Trading 0.3456 0.4178 -0.0799
(0.69) (0.66) (-0.21)
Discretionary Trading 0.0974 0.0887 0.5778**
(0.39) (0.34) (2.59)
Cash Indicator 0.0071 0.0073 0.0071 0.0073
(1.51) (1.56) (1.50) (1.54)
Pressure × Cash 0.4693 0.4866
(1.57) (1.57)
Expected × Cash -0.0743 -0.3261
(-0.14) (-0.51)
Discretionary × Cash 0.5937* 0.6571**
(1.81) (2.00)
Stress Indicator 0.0121* 0.0121*
(1.89) (1.89)
Pressure × Stress 1.1546**
(2.21)
Expected × Stress 1.7662**
(2.37)
Discretionary × Stress 1.0211*
(1.92)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Date FE Yes No Yes No No No
Industry × Date FE No Yes No Yes No No
Observations 52,354 50,633 52,354 50,633 52,354 52,354
R-squared 18.5% 34.6% 18.5% 34.6% 16.5% 16.5%
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Table VIII
Five-Factor Alphas from Portfolios formed on Discretionary Trades around
Fire Sales
The table examines five-factor (Fama and French (2015)) alphas from portfolios formed by
conditioning on the discretionary selling decisions of stocks that are experiencing fire sales.
We calculate ExpectedTrading as the portion of Pressure that equals fund flows prorated
to the stock-level using each stock’s weight in the portfolio, and DiscretionaryTrading as
the portion of Pressure this is not from ExpectedTrading. We then rank all fire sale stocks
into terciles based on DiscretionaryTrading. Column (2) shows the alpha (intercept) and
factor loads associated with a portfolio that is formed by buying fire sale stocks in tercile 1 of
DiscretionaryTrading, which consists of stocks with greater than expected selling pressure.
Column (4) shows the alpha (intercept) and factor loads associated with a portfolio that is
formed by buying fire sale stocks in tercile 3 of DiscretionaryTrading, which consists of
stocks with lower than expected selling pressure. Finally, column (6) shows the alpha to
a long-short portfolio that buys stocks with lower than expected selling pressure and short
sells stocks with higher than expected selling pressure. t-statistics, calculated using standard
errors clustered by firm, are shown next to the coefficient estimates in italics. In Panel A,
we examine abnormal returns to a portfolio that begins 5 quarters after the event date and
holds stocks until quarter t+8. In Panel B, we examine annualized abnormal returns to a
portfolio that begins 5 quarters after the event date and holds stocks until quarter t+12.
Panel A: Holding period = quarter t+5 through quarter t+8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Explanatory Sold More Sold Less Long-Short
Variable Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
Intercept (α) -1.1256** (-2.10) 0.8190* (1.66) 1.9446*** (2.90)
Mkt 0.1475 (1.17) 0.2452** (2.13)
SMB -0.7590*** (-3.88) -0.6131*** (-3.42)
HML -0.6131*** (-2.77) -0.4245** (-2.02)
RMW -0.4615** (-2.39) -0.4433*** (-2.59)
CMA 1.7338*** (5.77) 1.3646*** (4.79)
Panel B: Holding period = quarter t+5 through quarter t+12
Explanatory Sold More Sold Less Long-Short
Variable Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
Intercept (α) -0.0718 (-0.16) 2.0915*** (5.08) 2.1633*** (3.97)
Mkt -0.1548* (-1.73) 0.0030 (0.04)
SMB 0.4608*** (3.32) 0.1744 (1.40)
HML 0.2873 (1.57) -0.1226 (-0.78)
RMW 0.1087 (0.56) 0.4881*** (2.90)
CMA -0.6001** (-2.27) -0.1483 (-0.62)
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V. Appendix
This appendix provides additional empirical evidence to supplement the analyses provided
in the main text. Below, we briefly discuss each of the included figures and tables.
• In Figure A1 we plot the returns to fire sale stocks split on two proxies for fundamental
information: Short Interest and EarnSurprise. The results show that fire sale stocks
with high short interest earn abnormally low returns that do not reverse, while fire
sales stocks with low short interest experience small price drops that quickly correct.
Similarly, fire sale stocks with negative future earnings surprises earn abnormally low
future returns that do not reverse, while fire sales stocks with positive future earnings
surprises experience small price drops that quickly correct.
• In Table A1 we display a correlation matrix of the variables used in the main text.
• In Table A2 we examine whether mutual fund managers use their selling skill during
all periods (not just those with fire sales). To do this, we modify equations (3) and
(4) in the main text so that they do not condition on the magnitude of flow shocks.
Specifically, we calculate a measure of expected trading in each period (regardless of
flow magnitude) according to the equation:
ExpectedTradingNoFirei,t =
∑
j
(Holdingsj,i,t−1 × flowj,t)
SharesOutstandingi,t−1
. (11)
We then calculate a measure of discretionary trading by fund managers regardless of
flow magnitude according to the equation:
DiscretionaryTradingNoFirei,t = ActualTradesi,t − ExpectedTradingNoFirei,t,
(12)
where ActualTradesi,t is the actual change in holdings by mutual funds between period
t−1 and t for stock i. The results in Table A2 shows that fund managers are more likely
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to have discretionary sales in stocks with high short interest in all periods regardless of
flow shocks (model (1)). Moreover, consistent with the placebo test in the main text,
we find that expected trading is never related to stock characteristics (model (2)).
• In Table A3 we examine a linear probability model of the determinants of whether
or not cumulative average abnormal returns revert to zero during the twelve quarters
following fire-sales.
• In Section V.A, we provide a detailed discussion of the requirements for a valid proxy
variable.
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Figure A1. Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns in Event Time around Fire-
Sales for High and Low Quality Stocks
The figure plots cumulative average returns (CAARs) in quarterly event time for sub-samples of stocks
formed using two different proxy variables for negative information: (i) Short Interest (as a percent of shares
outstanding) and (ii) future earnings surprises (EarnSurprise) calculated using a seasonally adjusted random
walk model. Each quarter, stocks in the bottom decile of Pressure are grouped into two portfolios, based
on a proxy variable for negative information. In Panel A, we use short interest in the quarter prior to the
event quarter as the proxy variable: stocks above the sample median value of short interest are assigned to
the High Short Interest portfolio (dashed line), and stocks at or below the median value are assigned to the
Low Short Interest portfolio (solid line). In Panel B, we use earnings surprise in the quarter after the event
quarter as the proxy variable: stocks with a negative value of EarnSurprise are assigned to the Negative
Earnings Surprise portfolio (dashed line), and stocks with a positive value of EarnSurprise are assigned to
the Positive Earnings Surprise portfolio (solid line). As in Coval and Stafford (2007), cumulative average
abnormal returns (CAARs) are calculated as monthly returns in excess of the equal-weighted average return
of all stocks held by mutual funds that month. Detailed variable definitions are in Section II.C of the text.
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Table A1
Correlation Matrix
The table displays a correlation matrix of the variables used in the main paper. Pearson correlations are shown below the diagonal
and Spearman correlations are shown above the diagonal. The price pressure measure, Pressure, is defined in equation (2) and
based on Coval and Stafford (2007) and Kahn, Kogan, and Serafeim (2012). ExpectedTradingi,t is the portion of Pressure
that equals fund flows prorated to the stock-level using each stock’s weight in the portfolio, and DiscretionaryTrading is the
portion of Pressure this is not from ExpectedTrading. EarnSurprise is standardized earnings surprises in the period after the
fire sale calculated using a seasonally adjusted random walk model, LN(Short Interest %) is the natural log of short interest as a
percentage of shares outstanding, LN(Bid-Ask %) is the natural log of the bid-ask spread as a fraction of the closing mid-point,
and LN(Market Cap.) is the natural log of market capitalization in millions of U.S. dollars.
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Pressure 1.00 0.57 0.58 0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.02
Expected Trading 0.40 1.00 -0.15 0.02 0.04 -0.05 0.01
Discrectionary Trading 0.80 -0.24 1.00 -0.01 -0.04 0.02 0.00
EarnSurprise 0.00 0.01 0.00 1.00 -0.03 0.00 0.01
LN(Short Interest %) 0.00 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 1.00 -0.34 0.01
LN(Bid-Ask %) 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.40 1.00 -0.42
LN(Market Cap.) -0.03 -0.05 0.00 0.01 0.11 -0.40 1.00
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Table A2
Discretionary and Expected Trading Decisions of Fund Managers without
Conditioning on the occurrence of Fire Sales
This table examines selling decisions by all mutual funds according to an OLS panel model
of the form:
∆Holdingsi,t = β1StockCharacteristics+ Controls+ FEi + FEt + i,t,
where ∆Holdingsi,t is DiscretionaryTrading in model (1) and ExpectedTradingi,t in model
(2). The specifications are similar to Table III of the main text, which shows the determinants
of trading decisions by fund managers experiencing large flow shocks, except they look at
all trades, not just trades that occurred following large flow shocks. ExpectedTradingi,t is
the portion of Pressure that equals fund flows prorated to the stock-level using each stock’s
weight in the portfolio, andDiscretionaryTrading is the portion of Pressure this is not from
ExpectedTrading. StockCharacteristics is one of two proxy variables for information about
the fundamental value of the firm, either: (i) LN(ShortInterest)i,t−1 or (ii) future earnings
surprises (EarnSurprisei,t+1). In addition, we include two measures of firm liquidity: (i)
the bid-ask spread and (ii) market capitalization. Firm fixed effects and industry × date
(year-quarter) fixed effects are included in all models. Standard errors clustered by firm and
date are shown below the estimates in italics. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable:
Explanatory Discretionary Trading Expected Trading
Variables (1) (2)
LN(Short Interest %)i,t−1 -0.0009*** 0.0000
(-2.93) (1.35)
SUEi,t+1 0.0020 0.0001
(0.30) (1.04)
LN(Bid-Ask %)i,t−1 -0.0003 0.0000
(-1.41) (1.01)
LN(Market Cap.)i,t−1 0.0018*** 0.0000
(3.25) (0.61)
Firm FE Yes Yes
Industry × Date FE Yes Yes
Observations 125,524 125,524
R-squared 27.0% 36.1%
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Table A3
Linear Probability Model of Price Corrections Following Fire Sales
The table examines whether cumulative average abnormal returns revert to zero during
the twelve quarters following fire-sales. Specifically, we examine the determinants of price
corrections following fire sales. To do this, we examine linear probability panel models of
the form:
1Correctioni,t = β1ExpectedTrading + β2DiscretionaryTrading + FEi + FEt + i,t,
where 1Correctioni,t is an indicator variable that takes the value one if a stock’s cumulative
abnormal return reverts to zero within twelve quarters of a fire sale, and zero otherwise.
ExpectedTradingi,t is the portion of Pressure that equals fund flows prorated to the stock-
level using each stock’s weight in the portfolio, and DiscretionaryTrading is the portion
of Pressure this is not from ExpectedTrading. We include fixed effects in all models, as
indicated at the bottom of the panel. t-statistics calculated using standard errors clustered
by firm and year-quarter are shown below the estimates. *, **, *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Explanatory Dependent Variable: Indicator Variable for Price Correction
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pressure 0.0099*** 0.0034* 0.0029
(4.85) (1.76) (1.42)
Expected Trading 0.0034 -0.0006 -0.0010
(1.62) (-0.29) (-0.46)
Discretionary Trading 0.0104*** 0.0041** 0.0037*
(5.03) (2.13) (1.76)
Firm FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Date FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Industry × Date FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 54,628 52,354 50,633 54,628 52,354 50,633
R-squared 2.8% 24.7% 37.6% 2.8% 24.7% 37.6%
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A. Formal Requirements for a Valid Proxy Variable
Wooldridge (2010) discusses the requirements for a valid proxy variable. Formally, there are
two requirements for a variable, z, to be valid proxy variable for a latent variable q:
1. E[y | x, q, z] = E[y | x, q]
2. L[q | 1, x1, . . . , xK , z] = L[q | 1, z],
where E[·] is the expectations operator and L[·] is a linear projection operator. The first
condition says that the proxy variable z is not related to y after accounting for q. In
our case, this condition seems uncontroversial and implies that short interest or earnings
surprises would not be related to fire sales if we could control for the actual quantity of
negative information about a stock. The second condition is more complicated, and is
similar to an exclusion restriction in a standard instrumental variables model. It requires the
correlation between the latent variable q and each covariate x to be zero after we include the
proxy variable z. Of course, since q is unobservable, this restriction is inherently untestable.
However, Wooldridge (2010) notes that even if z is an imperfect proxy such that the second
condition does not hold, it is likely that the Ordinary Least Squares (“OLS”) estimator
will be better than if no proxy variable is included. Accordingly, we proceed by defining
ShortInteresti,t−1 and EarnSurprisei,t+1 as our proxy variables for unobservable negative
information about stock i in quarter t.
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